…. when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”
Sherlock Holmes in The Sign of Four

The time has come to re–define the notional context in which the plight of the Palestinians is perceived. Indeed, whether the resolution of the Palestinian problem is impossibly difficult or trivially simple is almost entirely a matter of the terms in which it is defined.
In principle there are two major ways of approaching the Palestinian issue. On the one hand, it can be addressed in political terms; on the other, in humanitarian ones — i.e. either as the problem of Palestine, or as the problem of Palestinians. If the former approach is adopted, no solution is possible, if the latter is adopted, solutions are eminently feasible.

The Palestinian rejection of the Barak initiative in 2000 — and the unequivocally violent manner of its rejection — underscore how infeasible a political settlement is and how futile continued pursuit of such a goal would be. On the one hand, it is difficult to see how any Israeli leader could offer substantially more than Barak did; but on the other hand, the outright — and brutal — repudiation of the proposal seems to indicate that that even this offer fell substantially short of Palestinian expectations. After all, if it were only marginally deficient, it is reasonable to surmise that they would have agreed to negotiate the unsatisfactory details rather than embark on the wave of aggression they opted for.

What then are the inherent flaws in the political approach? As a rough historical approximation, the wave which bore the kind of claims for national self-determination invoked by the Palestinians began in the forties with the end of WW–II, the breakup of empire and the casting off of colonial rule in far flung imperial territories with little generic affinity to the ruling European powers in terms of their social, cultural or historical roots. It peaked in the late 50s and early 60s, and petered out in the late 70s with virtually no political entities being granted independence from non–indigenous control after the mid–80s. The only significant subsequent additions of states to the international system, which had by that time to a large degree stabilized, were those that emerged from the dissolution of the Communist bloc in Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans and Central Asia. But this was a state–forming process entirely different in it political origins, in its political rationale and in its duration. It began in the 1990s and ended in the 1990s. It involved the disintegration of existing sovereign countries (or at least ostensibly sovereign countries) rather than disenfranchised people extricating themselves from alien control which eminated from distant centers of power in foreign capitals.

Accordingly, in many ways a plausible case can be made for the claim that the Palestinians have “missed the boat” of history in staking their national claims. Indeed, it seems most incongruous that in spite of the massive political support and huge sympathetic media coverage, the achievements of the Palestinian national movement should be so pathetically meager. This is a phenomenon that that must addressed — for no other national movement has been given such favorable conditions for success and yet reaped such dismal failure. This necessarily raises two glaring questions as to the merits of the Palestinian demands for a state: (1) Do the Palestinians really deserve an independent state of their own? (2) Do the Palestinians genuinely desire a state of their own?
With regard to the former, the answer appears to be “no”— not as a matter of opinion but as a necessary conclusion arising from the undeniable failure of the Palestinians to meet the test of history. For in conditions arguably more benign that those encountered by any other national freedom movement, with decades of unmitigated support from one of the world’s two post–WW II superpowers, and an international environment highly amenable to their cause, the Palestinians have not managed to generate any semblance of a stable productive society. Quite the contrary. Well over a decade after having the generous Oslo Accords virtually thrust upon them by a unprecedentedly accommodative Israeli administration that, by and large not only acknowledged their claims for independence, but identified with them, the Palestinians have done nothing but produce a repressive and regressive interim regime run by cruel, corrupt thugs who have pillaged their people. Indeed the Palestinian state has perhaps the unique distinction of achieving “failed state” status before it was actually established.
However, if the Palestinians do not seem to “deserve” a state — not by the standards of normative value judgments of their adversaries but by the dispassionate verdict of historical process — do they still really desire one??

Here again a resounding — albeit heretically counterintuitive— negative answer would appear to be valid. Indeed, nothing could corroborate this position more than the words of senior Palestinian leaders themselves. One of the most revealing of these excerpts was articulated the late Zuheir Muhsin, formerly the head of the PLO's Military Department and member of its Executive Council.

Almost a decade and a half after the first public endorsement of the Palestinian Charter, Muhsin made the following declaration in an interview with the Dutch daily Trouw:
“There are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. We are all part of one nation. It is only for political reasons that we carefully underline our Palestinian identity, because it is in the interest of the Arabs to encourage a separate Palestinian identity. Yes, the existence of a separate Palestinian identity serves only tactical purposes. The founding of a Palestinian state is a new tool in the continuing battle against Israel.”
(31st March, 1977)
Muhsin was not alone in this opinion. Almost exactly the same sentiment was expressed, at almost the same time, by Farouk Kadoumi, head of the PLO Political Department who in an interview to Newsweek, on 14th March 1977, admitted that "… Jordanians and Palestinians are considered by the PLO as one people."
However, most significantly, the position articulated by Muhsin coincides closely with that reflected in Article 12 of the Palestinian National Charter.

Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share toward the attainment of that belief, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it. (Emphasis added.)

The similarity seems especially pronounced when Article 12 is read in conjunction with Article 1.

Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation. (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, although the late King Hussein was not a PLO representative it is nevertheless interesting — and disturbing — to note that he expressed very much the same point of view when, in November 1987 in Amman, he stated: "The appearance of the Palestinian national personality comes as an answer to Israel’s claim that Palestine is Jewish.”

It thus appears that there is room for the "heretical" postulation that the real underlying Palestinian desire is not in fact the establishment of a state. Indeed, perhaps the time has come to suggest that most of the prevailing conventional wisdom regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is totally unfounded, even misguided.

In principle, there are two countervailing theses by which to explain the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is in effect the last enduring pretext for the wider conflict between Israel and the Arab — and the extended Muslim — world. According to prevailing conventional wisdom, the fuel of the conflict is the lack of Palestinian self–determination, and all the Palestinians aspire to, is to establish a state for themselves. There is however a competing explanation, which is entirely antithetical to the former — and which in light of the words and deeds of the Palestinians themselves, seems to emerge as the more plausible.
According to this alternative explanation, the fuel of the conflict is not the lack of Palestinian self–determination but the existence of Jewish self–determination and as long as Jewish self–determination persists, so will the conflict. Moreover, according to the alternative explanation, the goal of the Palestinians is not to establish a state for themselves but to dismantle a state for others— the Jews.
The question that now arises is: Which of these two alternative versions has the greater explanatory power? The answer seems to be unequivocally in favor of the latter. For it offers eminently plausible explanations for a range of events that the former is powerless to account for.
For example:

It explains why every territorial proposal, which would have allowed the Palestinians to create a state of their own (from the 1947 partition plan to Barak’s offer at Camp David in 2000), never satisfied them.

It explains why only the total negation of Jewish inde–pendence would appear acceptable to the Palestinians as evidenced not only by their rejection of any viable offer of a “two state solution”, but by much of their rhetoric and symbolism in which they invariably portray the whole the Land of Israel, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, as constituting part of Arab Palestine.
It explains not only why the Palestinians refrained from attempting to exert their national sovereignty in the pre–1967 “West Bank” and Gaza (as evidenced by the explicit text of their original National Charter1), but why today the Palestinians, as an overwhelming majority in Jordan, manifestly resign themselves to the rule by a Hashemite Bedouin despot, who represents the minority in the land.

It explains not only why they rejected the far–reaching generosity of the Barak proposal, but also the violent manner in which they rejected it. For although these proposals did include a proviso insisting on “end of conflict”, they were unprecedented in the concessions offered towards making a Palestinian state a feasible prospect. However the ferocity of the repudiation by the Palestinians seems to indicate that even these were far short of their real demands. After all if they were only marginally inadequate, it would be reasonable to expect that the Palestinians would have preferred to negotiate the details of issues of contention, rather than launch such an extensive wave of fierce and destructive violence. This is a response that seems to be explicable only if “end of conflict” is an unacceptable concept for them.

It explains why the Palestinians stubbornly insist on the “right of return,” which would imply placing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians (and possibly even more), now living in Arab countries, under Israeli jurisdiction, a position hardly consistent with an alleged desire to be free of oppressive Israeli control... or with an equitable two–state solution.

By contrast, none of the above phenomena can be reconciled with the explanation propounded by the advocates of conventional wisdom. For in reality the Palestinians appear to have little motivation in expressing their national sovereignty in territories under non–Palestinian Arab rule. Strangely, this desire only manifests itself in these territories when they fall under Jewish rule. Indeed, Palestinian efforts seem far more comprehensible if seen as directed toward the elimination or the undermining of Jewish sovereignty (by demanding either Israeli withdrawals where politically feasible, or Arab repatriation where they are not), than in the realization of their own independence. If this is true, then making ever more generous proposals regarding Palestinian statehood will be totally unproductive, indeed counterproductive, for these will induce no peaceable response whatsoever. After all, as Muhsin said: “The founding of a Palestinian state is [no more than] a new tool in the continuing battle against Israel.”

This of course puts the Palestinian cause and its accompanying narrative in a completely different light. Indeed, it would appear to severely undermine both the veracity — and more importantly — the legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative. For it is one thing to justify aspirations to attain one’s own national independence; it is quite another to do so if the real aim is to annul someone else’s.

The first step, therefore, towards laying the foundations for a humane resolution of the Palestinian problem is not only the contestation of the factual accuracy of elements in the Palestinian narrative or even their repudiation, but the de–legitimization of the narrative in toto — on the moral, historical and political levels. For as long as its perceived legitimacy persists, it will not be possible to abandon the insoluble political paradigm and to adopt the eminently soluble humanitarian one. As long as the current narrative is considered legitimate, it will not be possible to dismiss the Palestinian endeavor, as a national entity, to pry open Israel’s hold on the areas of Samaria, Judea and Gaza as the claimed territorial wherewithal required to constitute their state. Furthermore, as long as the Palestinians’ case is perceived as legitimate, violence can be presented as a justifiable component in their national struggle for freedom, while the use of most of Israel’s military might to quell it, will be perceived as inadmissible. Underscoring the perils that yielding these areas to Arab control will undoubtedly create for Israel will be of no avail. Since if it is admitted that the Palestinian have a legitimate claim to statehood (i.e. that they do indeed deserve and desire a state of their own), then the potential perils for Israel pursuant to the establishment of such a state are unavoidable ones to which Israel will have to resign herself.
However, if it can be shown that dispassionate analysis of the history of Palestinian behavior exposes their revealed preferences (as opposed to their declared ones) as demonstrating unequivocally that they are neither really deserving nor desirous of a state, then measures for initiating the removal of Palestinian state from the international agenda can be instituted.

However, the de–legitimization of the Palestinian narrative and the dismissal of Palestinian demands for statehood will not obviate the practical plight of hundreds of thousands of essentially disenfranchised Palestinian families resident in Samaria Judea and Gaza.
This is a predicament that still must be addressed and— dissipated. In this regard, the major thrust of the effort should be directed along two major channels:

(a) Generous monetary compensation to effect the relocation and rehabilitation of the Palestinian residents of Samaria, Judea and Gaza elsewhere in the Arab/Moslem world. The envisioned scale of the compensation is elaborated on subsequently.

(b) “Atomization” of the issue by making the offer of compensation and relocation directly to the heads of families and not through any Palestinian organizational structure.
The feasibility of such a proposal should be analyzed on three separate levels:
(a) The acceptability of the proposal of relocation finance to the prospective recipients.

(b) The acceptability of the proposal to the prospective host countries that would become future domiciles for the relocated Palestinians.

(c) The affordability of the economic cost of the proposal relative to other available options.

However before entering into an orderly analysis of these three elements a prior clarification regarding the feasibility (or lack thereof) of competing proposals is in order. In this regard, it should be recalled that the very raison d’etre for embarking on the Oslo process was realization that the previous proposals that were on the table (from the time of the signature of 1977 peace agreement with Egypt up until the early 1990’s) and which entailed the notions of territorial compromise and restricted autonomy were unfeasible — since they were totally unacceptable to the Palestinians. Consequently, the Oslo agreement, which in effect constituted virtually total Israeli capitulation to Palestinian demands, was presented as the only feasible alternative.
Unfortunately, the violent chain of events that has plagued the region for over a decade since the pomp and ceremony of the signature on the White House lawns, has proved otherwise. Indeed the approach adopted in the Oslo Agreements — and in the later and more radical proposals made in the Barak era— have proved disastrous misadventures. For not only have they failed to achieve any of their declared goals, but have actually exacerbated virtually all problems they were purported to alleviate. The increasingly generous concessions offered did nothing to satisfy the Palestinians but served only to whet their appetite, generating evermore avaricious demands. Consequently, the Oslo approach and its later derivatives — which were based on virtually complete Israeli withdrawal and the acceptance of Palestinian statehood — have the rare, if dubious, distinction of being one of the few alternatives that has actually been tried out in practice and has proved itself to be hopelessly — and demonstrably — unfeasible.

Thus, by and large, historical experience proves the futility of trying to coax the Palestinians (as a collective entity) in to an agreement with Israel — whether on the basis of partial or total acquiescence to their stated political demands. Accordingly, any alternative solution, which proposes to abandon the attempt to arrive at a settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians as a political entity, but rather strives to dissipate the conflict on a de–politicized, individual level, can hardly be deemed a priori less feasible. Indeed, unless one is ready to abandon entirely the notion of a nation–state for the Jews by not only relinquishing all the territories in Samaria, Judea, and Gaza to the Palestinians but also by consenting to the “right of return” (which will inevitably lead to an Arab majority in the country), new alternatives to the hitherto failed approaches are imperative.

With these points in mind let us now turn to the assessment of the feasibility of a proposed new “humanitarian paradigm” according to the previously suggested criteria of acceptability and affordability.

The acceptability of the offer for the prospective Palestinian recipients
It is highly plausible that should an offer of financially–induced relocation be made to (or via) some collective Palestinian entity, it would be vehemently rejected with genuine or feigned indignation. However what is suggested here is entirely different. Instead of the approach being made by means of some organized Palestinian body, it would be made directly by an Israeli — or an appropriately constituted international — entity, to the individual candidate recipients — i.e. the family breadwinners themselves. The scale of the offer would be of the order of magnitude of average life–time earnings in some relevant host country for each family head — i.e. the GDP per capita of such a country multiplied by at least say 50 years. Thus each prospective individual would be confronted with three possible choices: (i) a life under the harrowing hardships of Israeli rule with the accordingly dim prospects of a better life for him and his family in the future; (ii) a life under the probably even more harrowing hardships of some Palestinian regime, with commensurately dimmer prospects of a better life for himself and his family (iii) accept a sum equivalent to the life earning of an average citizen in countries with compatible socio–cultural and religious milieus that could serve as an appropriate alternative place of residence, such as dominantly Arab or Moslem countries in the Middle East, or countries with significant Arab/Moslem communities in Africa and Asia. By this "atomizing" the problem — and the decision–making mechanism as to the acceptability of its proffered solution — the proposal will militate towards “expropriating”, or at least attenuating, any veto power that is likely to be exercised against it by some organized leadership who clearly will have a vested interest in foiling it. Indeed, it is entirely feasible that elements in the existing Palestinian institutionalized establishment would embark on a campaign of intimidation and victimization to dissuade their kin–folk from accepting any offer of a financial package for relocation and rehabilitation. For quite understandably, little else could imperil their positions of privilege and power more than an erosion of their constituency — however poorly–served and exploited by them.
However, such harassment, should it occur frequently and forcefully, could be turned to the advantage of the proposal. For it will serve to bare the true, inhuman face of the Palestinian leadership, not only vis–a–vis the Jews, but towards their own people as well. It will be exposed as cruel cynical band which has no qualms at violently obstructing the free will of individual Palestinians who might chose to seize an opportunity to build better lives for themselves and their families by extricating themselves from the penury and privation which that leadership has wrought upon them. For the historical evidence strongly indicates that the Palestinians, under any past, present and conceivable future leadership, are neither really worthy, nor really desirous, of a state of their own. Accordingly denying them the pursuit of happiness, as individuals, through threats of physical violence on the part those posing as their chieftains, will underscore that the ordinary Palestinian is no more than a pawn in the hands of a degenerate elite, bent on attaining its own selfish ends — its implacable, but unacceptable, desire to eradicate the Jewish nation–state.

The acceptability of the offer to the prospective host countries
For the prospective host countries — either dominantly Arab or Moslem countries; or countries with significant Arab/Moslem communities in Africa and Asia — the proposal entails significant economic potential. For the Palestinians arriving at their gates will not be impoverished refugees, but relatively prosperous individuals with saving the equivalent of decades of GNP per capita in their pockets. This will confer on them, if not the status of substantial entrepreneurs, at least that of potential small businessmen. Indeed, for every hundred Palestinian families received, the host country could count on the influx of around ten to fifteen million dollars directly into the private sector. Absorbing 2500 new Palestinian family units could mean the injection of quarter of a billion dollars or more, into the local economy of countries direly in need of such funds. Thus should rationality prevail, the global community has the rare opportunity of generating a genuine win–win situation for all concerned — except for the failed fraudulent and fanatic Palestinian leadership.

The affordability of the offer to the prospective financing nations
A glance at the figures released in 2003 by the US State Department for some possible candidate host countries, or groups of host countries, provides a good idea of the order of magnitude of the funds required to implement the rehabilitation enterprise. According to official UNWRA figures, there are approximately 350,000 refugee families living in the "West Bank" (Samaria and Judea) and the Gaza Strip. Other sources indicate that the number of non–refugee families in these areas is roughly the same — i.e. a total of 700, 000 families in all.

Now if each family head were offered a relocation grant of between $100,000 to $150,000, this would be the equivalent of several decades — and in some cases, centuries — of GNP per capita earnings in any one of a wide range of prospective host destinations (see table). Indeed, even in terms of the overall world average such grants would be the equivalent of up to a quarter of a century GNP per capita. In terms of the GNP per capita that prevailed at the end of the 1990s in the Palestinian administered territories, the grants would be the equivalent of between over a half–century to almost a century of income. (Given the deterioration in the economic conditions over the last few years, the current figures would certainly be even higher in terms of the equivalent years of GNP per capita income.2)

1. Formulated in 1964, and in which the Palestinians explicitly eschew aspirations to "exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, [or] on the Gaza Strip..." (Article 24)

2. The World Bank reports that unemployment amounted to 37% of the labor force at the end of 2002. The stricter standards utilized by the International Labor Organization (ILO), which only include people actively seeking work in the labor force, show 27% unemployment at the end of 2002.
Per capita income fell by over 46%, compared with 1999, and the poverty rate, defined as less than $2.10 a day in income, was almost 60% of the population, compared with 21% on the eve of the intifada. The Palestinian population grew by 13% between 1999 and 2002.
http://www.globes.co.il/DocsEn/did=704221.htm

Source: US Department of State — WMEAT-1999-2000
* USAID-2000

If we now turn to the aggregate cost of the proposal, the total outlay required for the relocation of the refugee population will be between US $35–52.5 billion (depending on whether the relocation grant was US$ 100,000 or 150,000). Extending the relocation to the entire Palestinian population would effectively entail doubling the required outlay to US $70–105 billion. Given the fact that Israel's GNP is around US $100 billion, if it were to declare, in a rare gesture of international magnanimity, that it was prepared to devote annually 3–5% of its GNP to the resolution of the Palestinian problem in the humanitarian context— i.e. an annual sum of US $3–5 billion — the entire project could conceivably be implemented within a decade and a half. (In this regard it should be recalled that the current Oslo process, with all the enormous expense it has entailed, has been going on for more than a decade, producing no more than catastrophic failure and tragedy.) If international donors such as the USA, the EU or OECD countries could be induced to participate on the basis of matching Israel's input dollar for dollar (which would involve contributing only a miniscule portion of these countries' GNP), the implementation could be speeded up considerably— possibly to one half or even a third of the time (4–7 years) without undue burden on the world economy. On the contrary, the implementation of the proposal will entail the injection of tens of billions of dollars into low income countries giving their economies a direly needed fillip.

If the required sums seem daunting, these reservations should be quickly dispelled when they are compared to other outlays and costs incurred elsewhere. For example the hitherto cost of war in Iraq war has reached US $162 billion and could by some estimates eventually reach double that figure. This is clearly a sum that dwarfs the amounts proposed sums for Palestinian relocation and rehabilitation — which is also a considerably less violent and more humanitarian undertaking. A different perspective on the relative assessment of the envisaged cost will that show that the estimated annual cost of the current "initfada" to the Israeli economy is of the same order of magnitude as the estimated costs of the proposed relocation/rehabilitation initiative. According to Haartez, the first two years of the Palestinian violence cost the Israeli economy approximately US $8 billion. The leading business daily, Globes, quoting Bank of Israel sources gave almost the same estimates and projected a similar loss for 2003. For the purposes of this essay, the point of all this is that today's patently ineffective policy is not less costly than the proposed alternative.

Accordingly there appear to be compelling arguments for the firm rejection of apriori allegations that an adequately financed proposal to relocate and rehabilitate the Palestinian residents of Samaria, Judea and Gaza would be inherently unfeasible. This is true in terms of its acceptability to individual prospective recipients of the proffered relocation grants, and to the prospective host nations to which they would relocate, as well as in terms of its affordability to prospective sponsors — even if Israel were compelled to shoulder the burden itself.

The time has thus come to discard false, failed paradigms— however politically correct they may be. For in the Middle East, there appears to be a yawning — and ever–widening — gap between the politically correct and the factually correct. And any policy based on factually false premises is bound to end in disaster.
The time has come to acknowledge that the Palestinians, as a national corpus have failed the test of history. They have, for well over half a century, showed themselves to be manifestly unable to produce a credible, competent and capable leadership with the capacity to bring them to statehood — in spite of the highly amenable conditions which prevailed for them. Thus, having failed the test of history so irrefutably, they must be deemed as undeserving of a state. Furthermore, the manner in which they have conducted themselves during the past decades and the choices they have made over the last half–century, have exposed revealed preferences that are entirely inconsistent with a genuine desire to acquire Palestinian statehood, but are strongly compatible with the desire to eliminate Jewish statehood. Both these elements necessarily serve to severely undermine the moral and political legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative which has been the major propelling force not only for the propagation of the Palestinian claims for statehood, but for the much of the international acrimony directed against Israel.
The time has therefore come to challenge the legitimacy of this narrative — since its acceptance as a valid political tenet is the greatest and most irksome obstruction to any durable resolution of the Palestinian problem — or perhaps more accurately— the Palestinians' problem. It is thus essential that political issue of Palestinian statehood be taken off the international agenda, and attention focused on how to address the enduring Palestinian humanitarian predicament. The approach of relating to the Palestinians as a collective entity should be abandoned; and that of relating to them as tragedy–stricken (albeit largely self inflicted) individuals be adopted.

The time has come for imaginative new initiatives to defuse and disperse one of the global community's most volatile problems for which remedies hitherto attempted are evidently inappropriate. Accordingly, there seems ample reason to seriously address an alternative proposal, which at least, prima facia, suggests measures to:

Improve dramatically the lot of individual Palestinians

Defuse the Palestinian humanitarian predicament

Ensure the continued survival of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people

Inject billions of dollars of funds in to the economies of low income nations

The world can ill afford to dismiss it without a serious debate of its potential payoffs as well as its possible pitfalls.

Martin Sherman lectures in Political Science at Tel Aviv University and is the Academic Director of the Jerusalem Summit.
Dr. Sherman holds degrees in Physics and Geology (B.Sc.), Business Administration (MBA) and Political Science (Ph.D.).
He served for seven years in operational capacities in the Israeli intelligence community. From 1990-91 he held the post of senior advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, devoting much of his time to the formulation of water policy and the promotion of privatization in the agricultural export industry. In October 1997, he testified as an expert before Joint Economic Committee of US Congress in a hearing on economic and security trends in the Middle East. His academic publications include two books, The Politics of Water in The Middle East, (St Martins, 1999) and Despots, Democrats and the Determinants of International Conflict, (St Martins, 1998), as well as several articles in journals such as the Middle East Quarterly, The Journal of Strategic Studies, The Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Nations and Nationalism, and Nationalism & Ethnic Politics.
He acted the Academic Coordinator of the Herzliya Conference in 2001 and 2002.
Dr. Sherman writes extensively on economic and political issues in the Israeli national press in both English and Hebrew.

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