Arab Liberalism and Democracy in the Middle

Our goal today is not a political discussion but an attempt to make an assessment. Making an assessment requires separating analysis from policy recommendations. We have had a real problem in the study of Arab liberalism because the evaluation of the material has sometimes been so tied in with what people want to recommend that the United States or the West do, as well as what they would like to see happen.

We have now had in recent years three major situations in the Middle East where people 's goals and aspirations have gotten in the way of their assessment and have distorted that analysis. First of those was the Oslo Peace Process. People wanted peace, to believe it could be easily attained, and to achieve it. As a result, there was a significant overestimate of the Palestinian leadership 's willingness to keep its commitments and desire to make peace.

Next, many people wanted to encourage rapprochement between the West and Islam, and so they hoped that terrorism would not prove to be a big problem. This resulted in a significant misestimate of the threat of Islamist terrorism internationally.

After that, there were many people who thought that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was an obviously good thing, but this gave us mistaken intelligence information and an underestimate of how difficult it would be to establish a stable, democratic regime in Iraq.

Let us not make this mistake a fourth time by overestimating support for reformists in the Arab world and underestimating the difficulty they face because many people think Arab liberals are doing good and necessary things, as well as assuming that the Middle East is--or should be--a carbon copy of the West.

The kinds of problems I am talking about are illustrated by two articles published in late 2004 in two of the very top American newspapers. The first article claimed that Muslims are reassessing the more radical interpretations of Islam, which are very powerful now, and used as a specific example the argument that one would get several dozen black-eyed virgins if one committed a suicide bombing and went to heaven. But the entire article consisted of an account of a German scholar writing under a pseudonym saying that this claim is based on a linguistic misunderstanding. The researcher is not a Muslim, Arab, or Middle Easterner and his writing is not even appearing in Arabic or any publication in the region. Indeed, he so intimidated that he has to write under a pseudonym. So how does this prove that a reassessment is taking place? If one is, this article didn 't show it.

The second article, by an American, asserted that Arab liberalism has become very strong and that the reformers wanted active U.S. help. The article, though passionate and assertive, provided only two quotes from actual Arabs. One was from a very fine gentleman who stays clear of politics; the other was by an individual from whom I can bring ten statements in print saying the exact opposite of what he supposedly believes here.

So we must start with and stick with the evidence--and the evidence shows that Arab liberals are weak. If you actually survey all the possible literature, it is clear that they still represent a small minority, not only on the political scene, not only in public opinion, but even in the columns of the newspapers open to running liberal articles. We have done content analysis of newspapers like al-Sharq al-Awsat which demonstrates this fact. The question to be answered is why Arab liberals are so weak and have to water down their arguments so much. And the answer here lies in large part with the mechanisms through which the Arab nationalist regimes, the intellectuals who carry that ideology and serve those regimes, and the Islamist opposition dominate Arab society and discourse.

On top of this is the fact that there is a lot more being written by Arab liberals who live outside the Middle East. Even Arab liberals who live inside the Middle East are doing much of their writing in English--both in Western publications and local English-language newspapers--and are going much further in their views when they do write in English as opposed to Arabic.

This is understandable. I want to make it very clear that I am sympathetic to their efforts and respect their courage. But their struggle becomes all the more impressive when one understands how incredible are the odds they face and their own side 's pitifully few assets.

At this point, I must refer to a side issue that greatly distorts any discussion of this issue. The questions raised here revolve around issues like "Is democracy impossible for Muslims? Is it impossible for the Arab world?" These types of questions are nonsense. They are a waste of time.

If we look at the history of the world, every single society has gone through centuries of autocratic rule. It is very interesting to compare the Middle East to European history, going back several centuries. What we see is that the road of democracy is always very difficult and that it takes an incredibly long time. In England we are talking about centuries. The period between the French Revolution and the real institution of actual democracy in France was one hundred years. In Germany, to put it mildly, they had a few problems before they finally got it right. Russia took a 70-year detour through totalitarian Communism. And religious ideas, institutions, and hierarchies were persistent obstacles on the road to democracy in Europe.

So, what we see in the Middle East is not atypical in any basic way from Western history. No special factor involving Arabs or Islam is needed to explain the lack of democracy and social change in the Middle East.

What is, however, atypical about the region is that the year on the calendar page is 2004. Other places have already resolved the problems that plague the Middle East. In Latin America, though, much of this process of democratization only took place in the 1980s and 1990s, despite the fact that the area had much more of a foundation for democratization and a Western-oriented culture and religion.

The problem is not the essence, culture, or theology of the Arab world and Iran but the prevailing political and ideological system there. It is not that the Arab system failed to adapt to modern times. It has adapted very well to modern times in terms of keeping bad regimes in power. Again, there is a parallel to European history, Europe in the process of modernization developed two phenomena called communism and fascism, which arose as reactions against modernization and created incredible problems. Millions of people died in this process in Europe. In the Middle East there have been two parallel phenomena called Arab nationalism and Islamism.

In the modernization process--which includes democratization, industrialization, individualism, equality for women, urbanization, a weakening of religion, the development of mass commercial culture, and many other phenomena--a long time is needed, obstacles are thrown in the way, and movements arise which oppose these changes. One of the critical differences in the Middle East is that the retrograde movements have almost completely taken over all the political systems, control the economic system, and enjoy hegemony over thought. Groups and classes which spearheaded the drive to democracy and liberalization elsewhere in the world--students, intellectuals, labor unions, and businesspeople, for example--have been co-opted as supporters for the system. So overwhelming is its hegemony and ability to avoid blame for its failings--especially by putting them onto foreign scapegoats--that it is very hard to challenge and has tremendous power to intimidate its critics.

I wrote a book, The Tragedy of the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 2002), in which I tried to explain what the system is. It is a very fully developed system and includes everything from how you handle the military (for example, multiple forces including ethnic and ideological ones; special privileges); how you have a doctrine that justifies dictatorship (blaming Western imperialism and Zionism for all problems; maintaining a permanent state of war); how you win the support of the masses (control of media, schools, and even mosques); and how you build a sufficient base to stay in power (demagoguery, ideology, rewards, repression).

These systems--and obviously every country is different in some ways--are very effective at staying in power. The problem is that they are far less effective at bringing higher living standards, economic progress, more freedom, social change and things like that. Repression is only one element of the system and sometimes it is one of the least important aspects. For a rough analogy, think of the kind of system that existed in the Soviet bloc but even stronger. After all, in the Soviet bloc, religion and nationalism were often opposed to the prevailing regime. In contrast, in the Middle East these are two powerful tools manipulated by the regime or the Islamist opposition with which it has so much in common.

In short, Arab liberals are fighting against an incredibly powerful system, well-skilled at staying in power, at discrediting them, and at manipulating symbols. They have a very difficult uphill battle. 

Given this challenge, how do Arab liberals deal with the issues they face? After all, if they are going to argue for major structural reforms and all that entails, they must offer alternative explanations and solutions for the prevailing issues in their countries.

What are some of these critical issues? First, there is the explanation of why the Arab world is facing so many problems, why it is in such bad shape. The official answer tends to be imperialism and Zionism has held back the Arab world. Not only are the Arab regimes not at fault, but they must act as they do in order to survive and defeat the enemy.

Arab liberals have a choice of responses. One response can be an anti-system strategy. The reason for the mess in the Arab world is, "Because these dictatorships are in power. They are bad and incompetent. We must overthrow them in some way and institute democracy."

A second choice is to agree with the rulers by saying, "Yes you are right, the problem is imperialism and Zionism. But the system you have in place doesn 't face them effectively. So make the reforms that we want and then you can combat them much more effectively." Just as the Islamists offer their form of Islam as the only way to fulfill the existing goals, the liberals can do the same with their philosophy.

The third option is a more technocratic approach: "What we really need are certain economic and structural reforms, as China has done, that allow us to perform better without having to change the political system. So we are not against you, the government, we want to work with you to make it more likely you survive.

Finally, a fourth, related, approach is to offer the regimes an alliance against the radical Islamists. Only the liberals ' ideas and methods can defeat the great common threat, they argue. The regimes may play along but understand that they have more to gain by appeasing the conservatives however much they pretend to sympathize with the reformers.

The problem is that if the liberals follow any but the first choice, they are far more likely to be coopted, their message watered down and their arguments used largely to reinforce the existing system. Yet if they follow the first alternative they are more likely to be repressed by the rulers and ignored (or more likely, condemned) by the masses.

On every issue--whether it be women 's rights, the United States, Israel, Islam, the Iraq war, etc--the liberals have a choice of different courses to take, all of them pretty unattractive.

Aside from the substance of the argument--with which the Arab nationalists and Islamists have a much easier time--is the regime 's control of the means of expression. It can ensure that the schools, media, and (in some cases) mosques follow its line. The Arab nationalists and Islamists have far more money and many times more supporters than do the liberals. They have a complex network of rewards and punishments to spread their influence.

They also have a range of highly effective ways of sabotaging the liberals. Some of these might be called Middle East McCarthyism. The liberals are said to be traitors, agents in the pay of the Americans or Zionist agents, operating out of greed and sabotaging Arab society. They are said to be importing inappropriate, alien ideas which will bring ethnic strife or an Islamist takeover.

What is an Arab liberal to do? Should he say, "To call America our enemy is a lie. We need good relations with the United States. Its pro-democracy policy is a positive thing." Or should he keep his distance from America, covering that country with scorn in order to protect himself and pander to his audience.

Should an Arab liberal say, "The overthrow of Saddam Hussein is a good thing and a chance for a breakthrough to democracy," or should he make it seem as if the main fault of that regime was to go too far and thus provoke foreign intervention.  

Can an Arab liberal advocate peace with Israel or claim he has a more effective way to destroy it?

Difficult as these issues are, they pale in comparison with the difficult question of Islam. Historically, many democratic reformers in the West and elsewhere were secular and anti-religious. Look at the French revolution. Look at the Italian revolutionary nationalist tradition. Even the Arab left of decades ago argued that religion was a counterproductive opiate of the masses. But obviously this is not a very effective tactic for Arab liberals to follow today.

A second option is to say that Islam should be a matter of private life. It should not be in the public arena. Or reformers could say, "Let us work with those people who have more liberal interpretations of Islam." If they choose the former path, they are likely to be ignored; picking the latter, they will find very few partners. Once again, there is no easy way out.

Having said all this about the structural problems, the ideological difficulties, the difficulty in winning mass support, the repression, and so on, it is not surprising that the movement is very weak. It controls almost no institutions, except a few think tanks, or media outlets. There are no secret societies of sympathetic military officers, no strongholds in universities. Outside of Kuwait, there are virtually no real liberal parties, and even there a poor electoral performance shows the limit of popular support. There is not even any liberated reformist territory, no liberal equivalent of Moscow or Tehran. Iraq could possibly fill that gap, but events since Saddam 's overthrow give little cause for hope.

How sharply this contrasts with the history of Asia, Africa, or Latin America! Those places were and are full of liberal intellectuals, businesspeople, journalists, universities, newspapers, political parties, and just about every other form of endeavor. There are attempts to create such newspapers, television stations, and even universities. They are praiseworthy, but the process is barely in its infancy. The liberals are outgunned in every sector of society. It is going to take a long time to change this situation.

Then let us turn to the people. Arab liberals like to say that the masses are really a silent majority which supports them. There are some indications of this in polls but these are not clear-cut. Of course, people do not speak their real feelings as they live within a dictatorship. But I suggest it is reasonable to argue that there is a broad and genuine sympathy for radical Arab nationalist and Islamist positions. Some of this is due to indoctrination, constant propaganda. Some is due to rewards and things like ethnic loyalties--of Alawites in Syria and Sunnis in Iraq--or communal nationalism in religious form for Islamists--Sunnis in Syria and Shi 'a in Iraq. But it is there. It is dangerously misleading to look at the Arab masses as closet liberals.

When I tell people that I am writing a book on liberal Arabs, the standard joke is that it must be a short book. My response is to say, "No, on the contrary, there is a lot of material because the ideas and discussions are so interesting." But it is also true to admit that one must refer again and again to the same individuals, a courageous but small group which is far more often heard and is far better known in the West rather than the Middle East.

It is necessary here to say something about Islamism. This issue cannot be glossed over. True, radical Islamism inspires a lot of opposition among Arabs horrified that they would have to live in such a regime. In one Western poll series, Arab respondents were asked what kind of political system they favored. They were told to choose between an Islamic system or a democratic system. The majority chose a democratic system, which was used to argue that this was their true feeling. But when this is the choice, all the existing Arab regimes are classified as "democratic." This does not tell us about support for democracy but rather support for the status quo among those frightened by the prospect of an Islamist revolution.

Today, Islamism--not liberalism--is the main opposition movement and alternative doctrine in every Arab state. Now on one hand, Arab nationalism and Islamism are completely opposed and they are engaged in a struggle for power. On the other hand, they reinforce each other 's arguments on many points in an anti-liberal direction.

In addition, every liberal has to deal with what can be called "Islamist threat." In other words, if we consider Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Algeria as examples, citizens must pick between these two powerful forces against which liberal reformism is a minor factor. Do you want the Saudi monarchy or bin Ladin, the Algerian junta or the Islamists, President Husni Mubarak or Ayman al-Zawahiri? Like it or not, it is a credible argument when regimes warn that there will be anarchy, violence, and the possibility of Islamist revolution if people tinker with the status quo. Post-Saddam Iraq is an extremely graphic demonstration of that point.

So how do you deal with that? Now, if you are an Algerian liberal, what do you do? Do you say, "We have a military regime, we have an Islamist opposition, so I am for a third way." Or do you say, "If I had to choose between them--and I do--I support the regime." I think the latter path is the one that far more people are going to take.

There is a popular song in Egypt which shows how the anti-liberal forces put their case so effectively using nationalist and religious appeals: "Better Saddam 's Hell Than Bush 's Heaven." But there is also a phrase that could be used in Saudi Arabia that illustrates the equally effective use of this choice to gain support for the status quo: Better the Saudi monarchy 's hell than bin Ladin 's heaven."

All of these multiple factors undercut liberalism. Nineteenth-century Western liberals battled monarchies, many of which gave a large latitude for democracy, secularism, free enterprise, and cultural freedom--far more than is available in the Arab world today. Only when Western liberalism was stronger, even fairly hegemonic, did it have to confront Communism and fascism. And when it did so, liberalism fought this battle by being in control of powerful countries which defeated these enemies. Arab liberals must fight a highly organized, ideologically coherent, well-armed enemy in their movement 's infancy.

In short, we should not underestimate the power of the status quo, how long the process is going to take, how many setbacks it will suffer, and even whether it can triumph at all in anything other than a very long time span. More than one leading Arab liberal has said something like, "There are only two possible futures for the Arab world. One is Islam and the other is democracy." I don 't think that is accurate. The status quo, perhaps with minor modifications, is a third option. People think of the Middle East as an unstable part of the world. But in fact, literally in the last thirty years no Arab regime has really changed with the exception of Sudan and Yemen.

So we have to be realistic. This is going to be an extended struggle, and it is going to go on for decades. The outcome is not inevitable or simple. The forces of liberalism are weak. Will they grow stronger? I think they will, but how much stronger? How quickly?

Now, I do not want to get into the policy issues, but I will just make one remark here, which is external influence is going to be limited under any conditions. Let us say just for the sake of discussion that external influence is not going to be more than ten or twenty percent of the equation. Is that effect important and useful? Is it worth doing? Absolutely yes, but it is extremely hard to do right.

But again much of the talk about these issues is a debate that has more to do with Washington than with the reality of the Middle East. It is easy and common for people to talk as if Washington is the only place that matters. There is much ignorance about these matters in the United States, which usually goes in the direction of overstating the U.S. role. Some argue that U.S. policy is responsible for the sad state of the region; others that it can easily fix these problems. Both concepts are wrong.

These issues are going to be fought out and dealt with by the people in the region who are going to succeed or fail by the arguments that they make, the struggles they wage, and the tactics they adopt.

Let me repeat: good policy and good scholarship begins with a clear-eyed, unsentimental, non-partisan and honest attempt to understand reality. If things are not the way we would like them to be then we must begin by trying to accept that fact and to figure out whether it is possible to bridge that gap and how it could be done.

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